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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Negotiated Shareholder Value: The German Version of an Anglo-American 
Practice 
 
by Sigurt Vitols 
 
 
In comparative political economy it has become commonplace to distinguish between 
two types of corporate governance systems. In shareholder systems, influence over 
company management is concentrated with institutional investors holding small 
percentages of companies' shares. In stakeholder systems, influence is shared 
between large shareholders, employees, the community, and suppliers and 
customers. This paper contributes to the literature addressing recent changes in the 
German variant of the stakeholder system by proposing a few new concepts. On the 
level of institutions, it is argued that the stakeholder system is not being replaced by a 
shareholder system in Germany. Rather, an augmented stakeholder system is 
emerging through the inclusion of institutional investors in the old stakeholder 
coalition of interests. On the level of practice, it is argued that negotiated shareholder 
value is being adopted in Germany. This German variant of shareholder value is 
distinct from Anglo-American practice because major changes implementing 
shareholder value must be negotiated within the augmented stakeholder coalition. As 
a result, performance incentives for employees tend to be less strong than is the 
case in the US and UK. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Shareholder Value, Varieties of Capitalism 
 
JEL Classification: G3, J5, P5 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
 
Verhandelter Shareholder Value. Die deutsche Variante einer anglo-
amerikanischen Praxis 
 
In der vergleichenden politischen Ökonomie ist es Allgemeinplatz geworden, 
zwischen zwei Arten von Corporate-Governance-Systemen zu unterscheiden. In 
Shareholder-Systemen ist der Einfluss auf das Firmenmanagement bei 
institutionellen Investoren konzentriert, die kleine Anteile der Firmenaktien halten. In 
Stakeholder-Systemen ist dieser Einfluss geteilt zwischen Großaktionären, 
Beschäftigten, Gemeinde sowie Lieferanten und Kunden. Dieses Papier ist ein 
Beitrag zur Literatur über neue Veränderungen in der deutschen Variante des 
Stakeholder-Systems mit einigen neuen Konzeptvorschlägen. Auf der institutionellen 
Ebene wird behauptet, dass das Stakeholder-System in Deutschland nicht von einem 
Shareholder-System ersetzt werden wird. Eher wird eine erweiterte Stakeholder-
Koalition durch die Einbeziehung der institutionellen Investoren in die bisherige 
Stakeholder-Koalition entstehen. Was die Praxis anbelangt, so wird behauptet, dass 
verhandelter Shareholder Value in Deutschland entsteht. Diese deutsche Variante 
des Shareholder Value unterscheidet sich von der anglo-amerikanischen Version 
dadurch, dass die Einführung von Shareholder Value-Maßnahmen innerhalb der 
erweiterten Stakeholder-Koalition verhandelt werden muss und die Leistungsanreize 
für Manager und Mitarbeiter weniger stark sind als in den USA und Großbritannien. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In comparative political economy it has become commonplace to distinguish between 
two types of corporate governance systems (Hopt, Kanda, and Roe 1998; Jackson 
2001a; Kelly, Kelly, and Gamble 1997; McCahery et al. 2002).1 In shareholder 
systems, shareholders are the dominant interest group exercising influence on 
management, and the major goal pursued by companies is the maximization of 
shareholder value, that is, of the financial value of the firm. The US and UK are the 
best known examples of shareholder systems. In stakeholder systems, in contrast, 
power is shared between shareholders and other groups with an interest in the firm, 
particularly employees. Reflecting the diverse interests of these different groups, 
increasing the value of the firm may be only one of a number of key goals pursued by 
firms in these types of systems. Germany and Japan are exemplars of stakeholder 
systems. 
 
A major point of controversy is the extent to which stakeholder systems like Germany 
are currently facing pressures to change. At issue is the extent of influence of 
institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds, that hold small 
amounts of stock in each of a large number of companies. These types of investors, 
who are particularly strong advocates of shareholder value, have accounted for a 
steadily increasing proportion of share ownership in the recent past. Given the stark 
choices offered by the shareholder versus stakeholder dichotomy, one position in the 
debate is that these institutional investors are powerful enough to force stakeholder 
systems to convergence on the shareholder model (Eckert 2000; Itami 1999). A 
second position is that these investors do not exercise enough influence to change 
the fundamental features of stakeholder systems, i.e. that heterogeneity in corporate 
governance systems will continue to exist (Hall and Soskice 2001; Jürgens, 
Naumann, and Rupp 2000; Van Den Berghe et al. 2002).   
 
Recently, however, a number of researchers have been arguing that the stakeholder-
shareholder dichotomy is inadequate to describe the changes occurring in 
stakeholder systems. In Germany, for example, although the financial system and its 
role in corporate governance has evolved in an Anglo-American direction, labor has 
maintained its strong influence within the company through works councils and board 
representation (Cioffi 2000; Goyer 2002). Attempts to theorize this process include 
the concept of "hybrid" systems (Vitols 1999), multi-dimensional schemes for 
classifying corporate governance systems (Jackson and Aguilera 2003), and greater 
attention to the process of change (Höpner 2003).     
 
This paper seeks to contribute to this new body of research by developing a few 
ideas for conceptualizing recent changes in Germany. On the whole these recent 
developments are characterized as incremental changes in the German variant of the 
stakeholder model. These changes have occurred both at the level of institutions and 
of practice. At the institutional level, the postwar coalition of stakeholders influencing 
the firm (large shareholders, employees, the community, and suppliers and 
customers) has not been replaced by or driven out by institutional investors. Instead, 
this postwar coalition has been augmented through the integration of institutional 
investors into the coalition. One can therefore speak of the emergence of an 
augmented stakeholder coalition in Germany. At the level of practices, the typical 
                                                 
1 Many thanks to Lutz Engelhardt and Jana Meier for invaluable research assistance, to Pablo 
Beramendi for helpful comments, and to Martin Höpner and Gregory Jackson for useful clarifications.  
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goals that German companies have focused on after World War II (sales growth, 
employment stability and product quality) have also have been enhanced by rather 
than replaced by shareholder value. In contrast with the variant of shareholder value 
practiced in the US and UK, the German variant can be characterized as negotiated 
shareholder value, which has two key distinguishing features. First, the 
implementation of measures designed to achieve shareholder value in the interests 
of institutional investors must be negotiated with other members of the stakeholder 
coalition, particularly large shareholders and employee representatives. Second, 
reflecting the balance of power in this augmented stakeholder coalition, measures 
designed to achieve shareholder value are typically modified during the process of 
negotiation to take into account the interests of other stakeholder groups. Many 
shareholder value measures, such as remuneration incentives designed to align the 
interests of shareholders, managers and employees, thus take significantly different 
forms in Germany than in the US and UK, particularly where the interests of labor are 
concerned.   
 
The second section of this paper summarizes the debate on the extent to which the 
German stakeholder model is changing. The third and fourth sections provide 
evidence supporting the "incremental change" interpretation of current developments. 
On the level of institutions, the third section analyzes changes leading to the 
emergence of the augmented stakeholder coalition. On the level of practices, the 
fourth section focuses on specific examples of negotiated shareholder value, as well 
as on general indicators indicating differences relative to the Anglo-American variant 
of shareholder value. The final section summarizes and concludes.  
 
 
2. The Debate on the Nature of Change in the German Stakeholder Model 
 
In analyzing systems of corporate governance it is useful to distinguish between two 
levels. At the institutional level, national institutions influence the relative power of 
different groups with an interest in the firm. This includes both institutions structuring 
the internal organization and cohesion of interest groups, such as laws regarding 
trade union organization, and institutions regulating the interaction of these interest 
groups, such as company law. At the level of practice, companies embedded in 
different national institutional settings are distinguished by different mixes of strategic 
goals pursued, differing distributions of value added, and different organizational and 
operational characteristics. Drawing on Hirschman's (1970) concept of "Exit, Voice, 
Loyalty", interest groups thus differ in the extent to which they can exercise "voice" 
within the firm's strategic decision-making processes and in the possibilities they 
have to "exit" their relationship with the firm.   
 
In stakeholder systems, power is dispersed across a number of groups with an 
interest in the firm (Hutton 1995; Kelly, Kelly, and Gamble 1997; Vitols et al. 1997). 
These stakeholders typically include not only owners but also lenders, employees, 
customers and suppliers, and the community in which the firm is located (see figure 
1). Stakeholder systems are "insider" systems, in which interested groups are closely 
tied to the firm and exercise influence through institutional mechanisms for 
expressing (in Hirschman's terms) "voice" within the firm.  
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In shareholder systems, power is concentrated in the hands of shareholders, and 
other groups have little or no influence (see figure 2). Shareholder systems are 
"outsider" systems, in which market mechanisms play a much stronger role in 
governance, and owners exert influence on management through the threat of "exit" 
(selling shares). Owners in insider systems frequently hold large blocks of shares, 
often majority or controlling interests.2 Owners in outsider systems in contrast tend to 
hold much smaller percentages of shares, leading to a highly dispersed system of 
ownership.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The typical definition of a large shareholding, or blockholding, is that at least 5 percent of the total 
outstanding shares of the company are held by the same owner.      
Figure 1: THE STAKEHOLDER 
MODEL 
THE 
FIRM 
LARGE INVESTORS: 
BANKS, FAMILIES, THE 
STATE, OTHER 
COMPANIES 
EMPLOYEES: 
UNIONS AND/OR 
WORKS COUNCILS 
        COMMUNITY SUPPLIERS AND 
CUSTOMERS 
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This heterogeneity in the distribution of influence is reflected in differences in 
company practices between corporate governance systems. The dominant goal of 
companies in shareholder systems is understood to be the maximization of the 
financial value of the firm (shareholder value), since this is the primary interest of 
shareholders. Correspondingly, firms in stakeholder systems are understood to be 
concerned with a broader mix of strategic goals, such as sales growth and 
employment security, than shareholder firms.  Although profitability is a consideration 
in stakeholder systems, it will not be maximized if it conflicts with the interests of key 
stakeholders. Employees, for example, may have a greater interest in sales growth 
than in profitability, since sales growth implies an expanding firm and thus greater 
employment stability. 
 
 
Table 1: Median Size of Largest Shareholding Block, mid-1990s 
 
Country 
 
Largest voting block: Median (%) 
Germany 57.0 
Belgium 56.0 
Italy 54.5 
Austria 52.0 
Netherlands 43.5 
Sweden 34.9 
Spain 34.5 
France (CAC 40) 20.0 
UK 9.9 
US – NYSE 5.4 
      -- NASDAQ  8.6 
 
Source: Adapted from Barca and Becht (2001: 19, table 1.1). 
 
 
In practice Germany has become one of the most prominent national examples of an 
insider or stakeholder system of corporate governance. A recent large cross-national 
study showed that Germany had the highest levels of shareholding concentration 
Figure 2: THE SHAREHOLDER 
MODEL 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
THE FIRM 
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among the countries examined (see table 1). According to the study, the median size 
of the largest shareholder for German companies listed on the stock exchange was 
57 percent. In the US, in contrast, the median size of the largest shareholder for 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (the largest stock exchange in 
the US) was 5.4 percent.     
 
The role of large private banks has received special attention in the system of 
ownership in Germany. In contrast with banks in other countries such as the US, 
German banks are allowed to hold large blocks of shares in industrial companies on 
their own account. Furthermore, to a much greater extent than in the US or UK, 
individuals purchase their shares through banks and leave these shares on deposit 
with the banks. Banks have been able to exercise votes on the shares of these small, 
largely passive individual investors through a system of proxy voting. Banks have 
thus been able to control upwards of 90% of the votes exercised at many 
shareholder meetings (Pfeiffer 1986; 1993).  
 
A powerful institutional mechanism supporting the influence of the banks is the dual 
board system, which is mandatory for joint stock companies in Germany.  The 
supervisory board is responsible for making key financial and strategic decisions and 
for appointing top management in the firm. Day-to-day managers may only be 
members of the executive board. Banks insisted on this governance form in the 
reform of German company law in the wake of a wave of bankruptcies in the late 
1800s (Jackson 2001b). Banks nominate representatives to the supervisory boards 
of most large companies, including the chairs of these supervisory boards where their 
voting power is particularly large. 
 
Although receiving less attention than banks, other types of large shareholders have 
also played a key role in corporate governance, including founders and families (e.g. 
BMW, Krupp, Thyssen, Siemens, SAP), the state (e.g. VW, Preussag, RWE, VEBA) 
and other companies (e.g. Degussa, Fresenius Medical Care). These large owners 
are also represented on company supervisory boards, typically as chairpersons 
where they are the largest owners.  
 
Employees are a second key stakeholder group in the German model. Employees 
enjoy particularly strong rights of representation within the firm through the institution 
of the works council. Employees have the right to elect delegates to works councils at 
the plant level. This works council enjoys a wide variety of information, consultation 
and codetermination rights vis-à-vis management. In multi-plant companies, plant 
works councils appoint delegates to a company works council. Furthermore, in large 
companies up to half of supervisory board members are employee representatives. 
These include both representatives elected by the workforce (typically top works 
councilors) and appointed by external trade unions.  
 
The community in which the firm is located and suppliers and customers have also 
frequently been mentioned as two other important stakeholder groups in Germany 
(Hutton 1995). However, formal community influence is limited to companies where 
local or regional governments have ownership stakes and board representation 
(Bamberg et al. 1987). This is the case mainly in companies involved in 
transportation, utilities, or other local service provision. Community is therefore an 
important stakeholder group mainly through the ownership mechanism in a minority 
of companies. The importance of customers and suppliers as stakeholders in 
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Germany has also probably been overstated. Customers and suppliers probably 
played their most prominent role in governance during the 1920s through a 
corporatist system of cartel regulation. Although one frequently finds prominent 
customers or suppliers represented on company boards, this appears to be due more 
to the usefulness of having powerful and well connected industrialists on supervisory 
boards than to any intent to formally represent the interests of customers and 
suppliers (Vitols et al. 1997). 
 
The shareholder (or outsider) model, which is predominant in the US and UK, is 
institutionally a much simpler construct. Ownership is dominated by institutional 
investors, such as mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies, who are 
generally reluctant to hold ownership stakes of more than one or two percent, and 
who in principle do not wish to be represented on company boards. Other 
stakeholders such as employees generally do not enjoy voice in the company 
through formal representation. These countries have a single board system, and this 
board has in the past often been dominated by a single strong manager who 
assumed the role of both chairperson and CEO.3              
 
In the mid-1990s, a number of developments triggered a debate on the extent to 
which the German stakeholder system is changing. The first development was the 
increasing activism of foreign funds in Germany, such as Calpers (the California 
public employee pension fund), who stated that they would try to use their influence 
to make German companies pay more attention to small shareholders. A second 
development was the announcement by the two largest banks, Deutsche Bank and 
Dresdner Bank, and by the largest insurance company, Allianz, that they wished to 
reduce their presence on company boards and manage their share portfolios more 
according to “shareholder value” principles. Changes in tax law in 2000 in fact were 
designed to make it less costly for the banks to reduce their shareholdings (Höpner 
2000). A third development was Vodafone's takeover of Mannesmann, the first major 
hostile takeover in Germany (Höpner and Jackson 2003). A fourth development was 
that a number of large companies announced that they were adopting “shareholder 
value” as a key strategic goal; some of these companies made an explicit link 
between this step and the previous developments, such as the 
chemical/pharmaceutical company Hoechst (Eckert 2000).  
 
The dichotomous nature of shareholder-stakeholder typology initially forced people to 
decide between the alternatives of "convergence" and "divergence" (convergence to 
the shareholder model versus continuing distinctiveness) in this debate. 
Convergence advocates argue that the changes currently taking place in Germany – 
as well as in other stakeholder countries --  represent the transformation of a 
stakeholder into a shareholder system. Large “inside” investors are gradually being 
replaced by internationally-active investors, who increasingly have the capacity to cut 
off funding to companies that do not fulfill their demands for shareholder value (Dore 
2000; Inagami 2001). Wojcik (2001) finds some statistical evidence consistent with 
the convergence thesis. In particular, the median size of the largest shareholder has 
decreased by roughly five percentage points (from 65 percent to 60 percent) between 
1997 and 2001. In a provocative article entitled "Deutschland AG – a.D" Beyer (2003) 
finds that the number of bank representatives on company boards has declined 
                                                 
3 Recent reforms in both the UK and US have attempted to reduce the power of any single individual 
within the company board system, for example by seeing that the roles of CEO and chairperson are 
carried out by different persons.     
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substantially since the mid 1990s. Höpner (2003) finds a positive correlation between 
the degree of internationalization of share ownership and the adoption of shareholder 
value strategies by company management.   
 
On the other side of the debate, others have emphasized continuity in the German 
system of corporate governance and argued that current changes are only minor 
(Jürgens, Naumann, and Rupp 2000; Vitols et al. 1997). Vitols (2002), Jürgens 
(2002) and Kädtler and Spering (2001) have argued that the degree of influence 
shareholders have over management in industries such as chemicals and autos has 
been overestimated by convergence advocates. The Varieties of Capitalism 
paradigm (Hall and Soskice 2001) provides a theoretical explanation of why shifts in 
ownership might result in only incremental changes in the overall coordinated market 
economy (CME) system. The existence of complementarities between different 
elements of a CME limits the overall impact that changes in one subsystem might 
have on the performance of a system as a whole. Hall and Soskice, however, leave 
open the possibility that changes in finance might eventually lead to a crossing of the 
"tipping point" and thus a hop to a new equilibrium (i.e. the introduction of a liberal 
market economy or LME system) in Germany. 
 
Out of frustration with the strict corset of the “insider-outsider” dichotomy, a number 
of researchers have been trying to develop a more nuanced approach to classifying 
corporate governance systems and understanding processes of change within them. 
One key fact is that, although the partial “Americanization” of the German financial 
system and ownership is unmistakable, the labor relations system has remained 
quite stable and that works councils are still powerful (Cioffi 2000). Goyer (2002) for 
example has argued that labor in Germany exerts a veto right and thus has blocked 
the introduction of the most important parts of shareholder value in Germany. One 
approach has been to conceptualize change as a process of “hybridization”, whereby 
elements of both the insider and outsider models are combined (Vitols 1999). 
Another approach has been to introduce multiple dimensions for classifying corporate 
governance systems; for example, Jackson and Aguilera (Jackson and Aguilera 
2003) claim that there are three key dimensions of corporate governance – capital, 
labor, and management – and that each dimension can be conceptualized as a 
continuum. A further approach is to focus on change in Germany as a long-term 
process with multiple determinants and an uncertain ultimate outcome (Höpner 
2003).  
 
 
3. The Emergence of an Augmented Stakeholder Coalition in Germany 
 
In an effort to contribute to this more nuanced approach, this paper proposes two 
new ideas for helping conceptualize the process of change in the German 
stakeholder system. Drawing on the distinction made earlier between the institutional 
level and the level of practices, the first idea is that institutional changes have 
encouraged the emergence of a mixed system of ownership in which both large 
shareholders and institutional investors play a significant role. The result has been an 
augmented stakeholder coalition, which involves the integration of pro-shareholder 
value institutional investors into the postwar coalition of stakeholders, of which the 
most important members were large shareholders and employees (see figure 3).   
 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Towards a "Mixed" System of Ownership by Large and Small Shareholders 
 
A key argument of the convergence thesis is that, within the German system of 
ownership, large shareholders are being replaced by institutional investors who, as a 
rule, hold less than 5 percent of shares of individual companies. Statistically 
significant declines in the median size of the largest shareholder in the late 1990s is 
an important piece of evidence drawn upon by supporters of the convergence thesis. 
However, three critical points regarding the convergence thesis can be made here.  
 
First, even with the decline in the late 1990s, large shareholdings in Germany are still 
many orders of magnitude apart from the US. The median size of the largest 
shareholding in German listed companies in 2000 was still around 60 percent, as 
opposed to around five percent for companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. Even with a continued decline of five percentage points every half decade 
in Germany, it would take another 55 years to decline to the US level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: THE AUGMENTED  
STAKEHOLDER MODEL 
INSTITUTIONAL  
INVESTORS 
LARGE INVESTORS: 
BANKS, FAMILIES, THE 
STATE, OTHER 
COMPANIES 
EMPLOYEES: 
UNIONS AND 
WORKS 
COUNCILS 
THE 
FIRM 
COMMUNITY SUPPLIERS AND 
CUSTOMERS 
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Table 2: Largest Shareholders in the 30 Dow Jones Companies (2001) 
 
Company Largest Shareholding  
 % of Shares Shareholder Type  
    
3M Co. 5.8 Timothy P. Smucker Founder/family 
Alcoa Inc. 10.3 Fidelity Mutual Fund Group Institutional Investor 
American Express Co. 11.4 Berkshire Hathaway Institutional Investor 
AT&T Corp. 7.7 Putnam Investments Institutional Investor 
Boeing Co. 5.3 Fidelity Mutual Fund Group Institutional Investor 
Caterpillar Inc. > 5   
Citigroup Inc. > 5   
Coca-Cola Co. > 5   
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. > 5   
Eastman Kodak Co. 11.6 Alliance Capital Management Institutional Investor 
Exxon Mobil Corp. > 5   
General Electric Co. > 5   
General Motors Corp. 5.6 Fiat S.p.A. Company 
Hewlett-Packard Co. 10.4 The Packard Foundation Founder/family 
Home Depot Inc. 6.1 Fidelity Mutual Fund Group Institutional Investor 
Honeywell International Inc. 5.2 Alliance Capital Management Institutional Investor 
Intel Corp. 5.3 Gordon E. Moore Founder/family 
International Business 
Machines  > 5   
International Paper Co. 6.9 Alliance Capital Management Institutional Investor 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. > 5   
Johnson & Johnson > 5   
McDonald's Corp. 9.5 Fidelity Mutual Fund Group Institutional Investor 
Merck & Co. Inc. > 5   
Microsoft Corp. 12.3 William H. Gates Founder/family 
Philip Morris Cos. Inc. 7 Fidelity Mutual Fund Group Institutional Investor 
Procter & Gamble Co. > 5   
SBC Communications Inc. > 5   
United Technologies Corp. > 5   
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 38.4 John T. Walton Founder/family 
Walt Disney Co. 10.8 Steven T. Kirsch Founder/family 
     
Median 5.3   
 
Source: Company annual reports and filings with the Security Exchange Commission 
 
 
 
In this respect a comparison of the Dow Jones Industrial Index and the DAX (the 
Deutsches Aktienindex), the thirty largest companies in both countries, is instructive. 
In the US the median largest shareholding in the Dow Jones 30 Industrial (the thirty 
largest companies in the US listed on the stock exchange) is 5.3 percent (see table 
2). Thirteen of the thirty companies had no identifiable blockholder (i.e. no 
shareholder with a stake of at least 5 percent).    
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Table 3: Largest Shareholdings in the DAX 30 Companies, December 2002 
 
Company Largest Shareholding 
 % of Shares Shareholder Type  
    
Adidas-Salomon AG > 5   
Allianz AG 23 Münchener Rückversicherung Insurance  
Altana AG 50.1 Quandt Family Founder/family 
BASF AG 9.2 Allianz AG Insurance  
Bayer AG 5 Allianz AG Insurance  
Bayerische Hypo- und 
Vereinsbank AG 26.3 Münchener Rückversicherung Insurance  
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG 48 Quandt Family Founder/family 
Commerzbank AG 10 CoBra Beteiligungs GmbH Financial services 
DaimerChrysler AG 12.5 Deutsche Bank Bank 
Deutsche Bank AG > 5   
Deutsche Lufthansa AG 10.1 Bundesrepublik Deutschland State 
Deutsche Post AG 71.3 Bundesrepublik Deutschland State 
Deutsche Telekom AG 43.1 Bundesrepublik Deutschland State 
E.ON AG 7.6 Allianz AG Insurance  
Epcos AG 12.5 Siemens AG Company 
Fresenius Medical Care AG 50.3 Fresenius AG Company 
Henkel KGaA 58.2 Henkel Family Founder/family 
Infineon Technologies AG 71.9 Siemens AG Company 
Linde AG 13.1 Allianz AG Insurance  
MAN AG 36.1 Regina-Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH Founder/family 
Metro AG 56.5 Beshaim/Haniel Families Founder/family 
MLP AG 27.3 Manfred Lautenschläger Founder/family 
Müncher Rückversicherung AG 24.8 Allianz AG Insurance  
RWE AG 13.3 Allianz AG Insurance  
SAP AG 62.5 Klaus Tschira Stiftung GmbH Founder/family 
Schering AG 10.6 Allianz AG Insurance  
Siemens AG 6.9 Siemens Family Founder/family 
ThyssenKrupp AG 16.9 
Alfried von Bohlen u. Halbach Krupp-
Stiftung Founder/family 
TUI AG (formerly Preussag AG) 29.1 Westdeutsche Landesbank State 
Volkswagen AG 20 Land Niedersachsen State 
    
Median 21.5   
 
Source: Company annual reports and company websites.  
  
 
When examining the individual companies in the DAX, the index of the 30 largest 
German listed companies, one sees the continuing influence of large shareholders. 
Only three of the DAX companies at the end of 2002 had no large shareholder: 
Addidas-Salomon, Deutsche Bank, and Siemens (see table 3). Of these companies 
with large shareholders, banks were the largest shareholders at only two of the firms, 
versus insurance companies at eight, founders and families at four, and other 
companies at three.  
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Second, it is not clear that the trend can continue at this pace, or even at all. The 
increasing importance of institutional investors is predicated on their ability to capture 
a greater share of the flow of funds by the ultimate investors, namely households. 
The second half of the 1990s was characterized precisely by this development. 
Households in the US and UK significantly increased their investments in pension 
funds and mutual funds. As companies in those countries became overvalued, these 
institutional investors increasingly sought investments abroad, including in Germany. 
The net foreign purchase of German equities increased rapidly in the second half of 
the 1990s, reaching a high of almost €130 billion in 1999 (see table 4).  
 
 
 
Table 4: Net Foreign Inflow of Stock Purchases in Germany (in billion €) 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 
German Purchases of  
Foreign Stocks 0.6 -4.3 4.5 0.4 -1.7 6.0 10.8 51.7 45.2 -24.6 68.8 14.2 
 
Foreign Purchases of  
German Stocks 12.6 8.4 10.9 14.3 13.1 23.1 51.9 105.6 126.8 119.1 51.0 46.3 
 
Net Foreign Inflow  12.0 12.7 6.4 13.9 14.7 17.1 41.1 53.9 81.6 143.8 -17.8 32.1 
 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Flow of Funds Accounts. 
 
 
 
At the same time households in Germany also increased the allocation of their 
savings into stocks and stock funds in the late 1990s, reaching a high of a combined 
total of about €80 billion in 2000 (see table 4).  
 
 
 
Table 5: German Household Allocation of Savings (in billion €) 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Cash and Bank Deposits 57.8 68.2 98.8 4.2 34.5 52.2 28.6 45.8 10.7 -31.1 27.3 78.9 
Bonds 24.1 3.6 -15.1 36.8 25.7 6.5 6.6 -11.3 1.9 5.5 9.5 1.4 
Stocks 0.3 -0.5 3.4 6.1 -1.7 5.4 4.1 4.1 13.8 18.4 -28.7 -61.0 
Mutual Funds 13.8 27.6 18.5 42.4 10.7 10.9 20.3 32.1 44.0 54.4 51.2 36.5 
Insurance 31.9 35.4 42.4 47.3 51.0 54.7 57.7 59.9 61.7 56.4 48.0 53.8 
 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Flow of Funds Accounts. 
 
 
 
These trends, however, appear to have been reversed since 2000. Foreign 
purchases of German equities declined sharply in 2001; taking into account German 
purchases of foreign equities (presumably mostly by German institutional investors), 
there was actually a net foreign outflow of € 18 billion in that year (table 4). German 
households also pulled a total of €29 billion from the stock market in 2001 and 
another € 61 billion in 2002. German household investments in mutual funds are also 
down sharply from levels experienced at the peak of the bubble in 2000 (table 5).   
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Although some of this volatility is driven by short-term influences, primarily the bubble 
and its bursting, there are reasons to believe that long-term trends will stabilize or 
even reverse the shift of funds to institutional investors. One reason is that the baby 
boomer generation, which invested a large proportion of its retirement assets in 
stocks, is now starting to retire, and withdrawals from this group will increase over 
time (Davis and Li 2002). A second is that trends in investment activity are very long-
term, and an aversion to financial assets with higher levels of risk may last a very 
long time. In Germany the aversion to risky financial assets was always higher than 
in the US, and the serious losses that many of the German "latecomers" to the game 
suffered may be reflected in very long-term aversion to stocks. It appears that the 
Riester reform of 2001, which was designed to encourage more private savings, will 
not do much to encourage the flow of funds to the stock market. The requirements 
imposed on personal and company pension plans by the Riester reform encourages 
the flow of funds into more conservative financial assets such as bonds and bank 
savings deposits (Vitols 2003).  
  
Third, although the large private banks and Allianz, the largest insurance company, 
have announced that they wish to change their practices, it is not clear that this 
means that they – or other large shareholders – wish to reduce their holdings and 
role in governance down to US levels. The subsidiary that Deutsche Bank set up to 
manage its equity holdings, DB Investor, has taken new large stakes in companies, 
for example in the battery manufacturer Varta.4 Insurance companies, particularly 
Allianz, are accumulating more and more funds over time and thus will have to 
increase their overall stakes in companies. Many founders and families have 
maintained their commitments to companies and have not reduced their equity 
stakes. Finally, spinoffs by firms have generally taken the form of partial stakes being 
sold on the stock exchanges (e.g. Siemens has retained stakes of 72 percent and 
12.5 percent of the semiconductor manufactuer Infineon and components producer 
Epcos, respectively). Companies also remain eager to acquire new equity stakes in 
other companies that fit into their strategic portfolios. For example, at the end of 2002 
the electronics company Robert Bosch bought up an eight percent stake in the mid-
cap company Buderus from the Deutsche Bank. The federal state has also generally 
pursued partial rather than full privitizations, retaining 71 percent of the Deutsche 
Post and 43 percent of Deutsche Telekom. 
 
When calculating the median size of the largest shareholding in Germany for each 
individual year, it is therefore not surprising that this size appears to have stabilized 
(and in fact slightly increased, from 63 to about 64 percent) since 1999.5 It thus 
appears that a mixed system of ownership involving large shareholders and 
institutional investors is a feature that will characterize Germany for the foreseeable 
future.  
 
Stability in the Role of Labor 
 
Many accounts of the declining role of labor in Germany have focused on the 
collective bargaining system, primarily on the decline in the level of trade union 
                                                 
4 Varta was in the MDAX, the midcap index for German stocks, but its management wished to take it private 
(i.e. delist it from the stock exchange) since it felt that its stock was undervalued by small investors.   
5 This figure was calculated on the basis of data files supplied by BAFin, or the Federal Supervisory Office for 
Financial Services. Note that this estimate is slightly higher than that derived by Wojcik (2001). 
 13 
membership and the flight of some employers from employers' associations. Within 
firms, in contrast, works councils have, if anything, become a more important force 
for representing the interests of labor, both vis-à-vis management at the plant level 
and via the supervisory board at the company level (Thelen and Kume 2003).  
 
Recent legislative changes have affected both company law and the works 
constitution act. Resisting proposals from some parties to reduce the influence of 
labor, the conservative-liberal coalition government's reform of company law in 1997 
confirmed the dual board system and left the parameters of employee representation 
on company boards essentially unchanged (Ziegler 2000). A reform of the Works 
Constitution Act in 2001 under the red-green coalition government even strengthened 
the legal rights of works councils. For example, the minimum number of employees in 
a plant needed before a works councilor is released from normal duties to work full-
time on works council business was reduced from 300 to 200. The ability of works 
councils to represent employees in companies with many small branches, which is 
typical of the service sector, was also strengthened (Behrens 2003).  
 
Accounts of industrial relations claim that there is no tendency of works councils to 
lose influence, and in many companies influence even seems to have increased 
through a closer "partnership" with management to solve problems (Höpner, 
Jackson, and Kurdelbush forthcoming; Jacobi, Keller, and Müller-Jentsch 1998).  
 
Summing Up: Changes in the Role of the Stakeholders 
 
As reviewed above, the importance of the community and of suppliers and customers 
as stakeholders has probably been overestimated in many stylized accounts of the 
German model, with the exception of companies in which local or regional 
governments have a significant ownership role. Although some regional and local 
governments have announced the intention to privatize some companies, progress in 
this respect has been slow, and the tendency of local and regional governments has 
been to partially rather than to fully privatize.    
 
Thus the main change in the German stakeholder model has been the integration of 
institutional investors into the coalition. Although the role of some large shareholders, 
particularly the large private banks, may have been reduced, other large 
shareholders remain committed to a strong corporate governance role. The influence 
of employees as stakeholders has also remained stable, and in some respects even 
been strengthened by the reform of the works constitution act. Thus it is possible to 
speak of the emergence of an augmented stakeholder coalition in German corporate 
governance. 
 
 
4. Consequences for Practice: Negotiated Shareholder Value 
 
At the level of practice, a major consequence of the integration of institutional 
investors in the augmented stakeholder coalition is that their interest in shareholder 
value must be taken into account. However, due to the existence of this coalition, the 
practice of shareholder value in Germany differs in two important ways from the 
Anglo-American variant of shareholder value. First, the introduction of shareholder 
value concepts must be negotiated with other members of the coalition. Due to the 
reluctance of institutional investors to be linked too closely to firms, e.g. through 
 14 
representation on the supervisory board, this requires the establishment of new 
institutional mechanisms for mediating this relationship. Second, due to the different 
interests of the members of the stakeholder coalition, compromises need to be found 
which typically alter the nature of the demands made by institutional investors. This 
German variant can thus be characterized as negotiated shareholder value. This 
contrasts with Anglo-American shareholder value, which tends to be unilaterally 
imposed by management in the interests of shareholders. 
 
What sort of evidence would support this thesis against the alternative theses of 
convergence or no essential change? First, one would expect evidence of a 
bargaining process, in which the original demands of a member of the coalition are 
confronted with objections or alternative proposals from other members of the 
coalition. Second, one would expect that where opposition is strongest, the original 
proposals for shareholder value would be modified or even blocked. As a result of the 
dynamics of this augmented stakeholder coalition, one would expect a modification of 
the practices in German companies which take into account some of the demands of 
institutional investors, without at the same time fully converging to the Anglo-
American style of shareholder value. 
 
An important change at large German companies has been the introduction of 
investor relations departments to institutionalize the dialogue with institutional 
investors. These departments are typically under the finance director, and are 
responsible for providing institutional investors with timely and detailed information 
about the financial status of the company and other key information. Studies indicate 
that the introduction of investor relations units has been virtually universal within large 
German companies (Welskopp 2002).     
 
Interviews conducted by the author of this paper with works councilors and managers 
in a number of large German companies indicate that demands for shareholder value 
are typically transmitted by the finance director into the management board and into 
negotiations with other stakeholders. This is not surprising given that the finance 
director is the nearest of the managing directors to investors.    
 
One fairly rapid and universal change in the practices of large German companies 
was the introduction of international accounting standards (US-GAAP or IAS) at large 
German companies. German companies have traditionally used HGB 
(Handelsgesetzbuch) standards, which make comparison between companies 
difficult due to the numerous options for the accounting department to recognize 
income, or to even hide some of this income from investors ("hidden reserves"). The 
introduction of international accounting standards is one of the key demands of 
institutional investors, since they feel that they cannot truly measure the value of the 
firm in the absence of such transparency. Other members of the stakeholder 
coalition, in contrast, are relatively indifferent regarding the type of accounting 
standards used.6 Thus it is not surprising that adoption of these standards has been 
very rapid and practically universal.    
 
                                                 
6 Höpner and Goyer emphasize the extent to which employees may have a positive interest in 
international accounting standards. Interviews with works councilors. However, the author's interviews 
indicate that relative indifference is probably a more accurate characterization of their actual attitudes 
towards these changes.   
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One also finds that many companies have explicitly adopted shareholder value as 
one of their main corporate goals. Interestingly enough, however, many German 
companies have taken pains to avoid using either the English term or its direct 
translation into German, for example, with the phrase wertorientierte 
Unternehmensführung.    
 
More interesting are the cases where there are real concerns or differences of 
interest between large shareholders. There are numerous recent examples which 
show that that large shareholders remain intimately involved in decision making in the 
firm, including in decisions about the implementation of corporate restructuring to 
achieve shareholder value. One interesting example is the introduction of 
shareholder value at Hoechst, one of the "Big Three" diversified chemical-
pharmaceutical companies in Germany (Vitols 2002). One of the key demands of 
institutional investors was that the company should "de-diversify" by selling off either 
its chemicals or pharmaceuticals divisions. In fact Jürgen Dormann, the CEO (and 
former finance director) of Hoechst, proposed that Hoechst should become a pure life 
sciences  company by selling off its chemicals operations and building up critical 
mass in pharmaceuticals through merger. Dormann entered into merger negotiations 
with Rhone-Poulenc, a French company also involved in a variety of chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals operations. As part of the merger negotiations, however, Dormann 
had to fly to Kuwait to negotiate with the Kuwaiti government, which held a 25% stake 
in the company. Dormann could proceed with the merger of the two companies into a 
new company, Aventis, only after the Kuwaiti government was satisfied that its 
interests would not be harmed by the merger.  
 
Another interesting example of the continued importance of large shareholders is the 
restructuring of the German financial services industry. German financial services 
firms, particularly banks, have come under increasing criticism from institutional 
investors, since their profitability is particularly low in comparison with Anglo-
American banks. One of the demands of institutional investors is that German banks 
should merge in order to achieve economies of scale and reduce the degree of 
"overbanking" in Germany. As a key shareholder in the large German banks, Allianz 
plays a key role in the restructuring of the German financial services industry. 
Allianz's consent had to be obtained in negotiations between Bayerische Hypobank 
and the Bayerische Vereinsbank, which merged to form the third largest private bank, 
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank. Allianz's permission was also needed in the 
merger proposal between Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank. When this merger 
failed due to internal management differences, Allianz stepped in and bought up the 
rest of Dresdner bank itself.  
 
There are even more numerous examples of the involvement of works councils in 
negotiations over the introduction of shareholder value. One key demand of 
institutional investors is that employee and management remuneration should be tied 
more closely to performance, in the ideal case directly to share price. In Anglo-
American companies, changes in incentive pay to base a greater proportion of pay 
on performance and profitability are generally imposed by top management. 
Furthermore, performance bonuses and pay increases are typically based on 
evaluations by immediate supervisors. In Germany, in contrast, changes in 
remuneration systems must be negotiated with the works council, which generally 
requires elements of collective regulation and limits on the extent of performance 
pay.  
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One typical example of how negotiated shareholder value works here is the response 
of the works council at Schering AG to demands from the finance director for more 
incentive pay.7 The works council agreed in principle to introducing performance pay, 
but imposed a number of conditions for agreement. One was that performance pay 
only represent a small proportion of total remuneration. A second condition was that 
certain floors and ceilings be imposed on the amount of incentive pay received by 
each employee, to help maintain solidarity among the workforce. A third condition 
was that evaluations be based on standardized forms agreed between management 
and the works council, in order to improve transparency and fairness in the 
evaluation procedure.  
 
A second example of involvement of works councils are involved in negotiated 
shareholder value is the problem of under-performing business units. Anglo-
American companies typically impose relatively short periods of time on business 
units which do not achieve important financial goals to improve their performance 
before they will be closed or sold off.  In German companies, however, the 
involvement of works councils typically alters the way in which this problem is dealt 
with. First, the right of works councils to negotiate social plans for large scale layoffs 
makes closure more difficult and expensive. Second, once the decision to sell has 
been made, works councils are typically involved in negotiations with potential 
buyers, and can influence the decision in favor of buyers who will better take into 
account the interests of employees rather than top price. VEBA's sale of AstaMedica 
(Zugehör 2001) and Bayer's sale of its pigments division to the US company Kerr-
McGee are examples of this kind of involvement.8  
 
Many other types of examples of works council involvement in different kinds of 
restructuring can be found which alter the original demands to achieve shareholder 
value in the interests of shareholders. The works council at Mannesmann agreed with 
the takeover proposal of Vodafone when an arrangement was made to find a "good 
German buyer" for the non-telecommunications parts of the company (steel and auto 
parts) (Höpner and Jackson 2003). Siemens, the large diversified electronics 
company, has also been seen as one of the most dramatic examples of an attempt to 
introduce shareholder value in Germany. Siemens has long been criticized by 
institutional investors for the "cross-subsidization" of under-performing divisions by 
better-performing divisions. When the telecommunications equipment division made 
serious losses in 2001 and 2002, the division head demanded serious job cuts to try 
to attain profitability. The works council, however, opposed such drastic job cuts, and 
instead a more moderate package of job cuts in the telecommunications equipment 
division was agreed.  
 
Overall indicators of company practice and performance are also consistent with the 
picture that German company practices have in fact been modified, but remain far 
away from convergence to the Anglo-American model. One example of this is the use 
of stock options to align the interests of top company managers with shareholders. A 
change in company law change in 1997 authorized German companies to introduce 
stock option plans, thus making it much easier for management remuneration to be 
                                                 
7 Based on an interview with the chairman of the group works council, September 1999. 
8 The case of Bayer based on an interview in May 2001 with a works councilor at the subsidiary that 
was sold.  
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tied to share performance.9 Since then most large German companies have in fact 
established stock option plans. However, German companies use stock options to a 
much lesser degree than Anglo-American companies.  
 
 
Table 6: Stock Options Outstanding as a % of Total  Shares Outstanding  
30 Dow Jones Industrial Companies (end 2001) 
 
Company Options as a % of Share Capital 
  
3M Co. 8.8 
Alcoa Inc. 8.7 
American Express Co. 11.0 
AT&T Corp. 8.9 
Boeing Co. 3.4 
Caterpillar Inc. 9.4 
Citigroup Inc. 7.2 
Coca-Cola Co. 5.7 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 6.7 
Eastman Kodak Co. 17.3 
Exxon Mobil Corp. 3.9 
General Electric Co. 3.6 
General Motors Corp. 3.7 
Hewlett-Packard Co. 11.2 
Home Depot Inc. 3.0 
Honeywell International Inc. 6.6 
Intel Corp. 11.5 
International Business Machines Corp. 9.3 
International Paper Co. 6.0 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 9.8 
Johnson & Johnson 5.4 
McDonald's Corp. 11.6 
Merck & Co. Inc. 6.6 
Microsoft Corp. 16.6 
Philip Morris Cos. Inc. 6.4 
Procter & Gamble Co. 7.7 
SBC Communications Inc. 4.0 
United Technologies Corp. 7.2 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 1.1 
Walt Disney Co. 9.0 
  
Average 7.7 
Source: Company annual reports and filings with the Security Exchange Commission. 
 
 
One simple but useful indicator for comparing the degree to which stock options are 
used in a company is to divide the number of stock options granted and outstanding 
to the total number of shares outstanding.  Table 6 shows the stock 
                                                 
9 Previous to this legal change it was much more difficult for companies to link management 
performance to share price. The main instrument for doing this was to give management loans to 
purchase convertible bonds, which however was a quite complex and indirect mechanism.     
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option/outstanding shares ratio at Dow Jones Industrial 30 companies. The average 
option/share ratio for these companies is 7.7 percent. The ratio ranges from a low of 
1.1 percent (at Wal-Mart) to a high of 17.3 percent (at Eastman Kodak).  
 
 
Table 7: Stock Options Outstanding as a % of Total  Shares Outstanding 
DAX 30 Companies, December 2002 
 
Company Options as % of Share Capital 
  
Adidas-Salomon AG 1.1 
Allianz AG 0.3 
Altana AG 1.7 
BASF AG 0.5 
Bayer AG 0.0 
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG 0.0 
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG 0.0 
Commerzbank AG 0.0 
DaimerChrysler AG 4.2 
Deutsche Bank AG 2.7 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG 0.4 
Deutsche Post AG 0.5 
Deutsche Telekom AG 0.2 
E.ON AG 0.6 
Epcos AG 0.9 
Fresenius Medical Care AG 2.6 
Henkel KGaA 0.2 
Infineon Technologies AG 1.8 
Linde AG 0.0 
MAN AG 0.0 
Metro AG 0.4 
MLP AG 0.0 
Müncher Rückversicherung AG 0.1 
RWE AG 1.0 
SAP AG 2.2 
Schering AG 1.1 
Siemens AG 1.4 
ThyssenKrupp AG 1.5 
TUI AG 0.0 
Volkswagen AG 1.7 
  
Average 0.9 
 
Source: Company Annual Reports 
 
 
Table 7 shows the same ratio for the DAX 30 companies. It is striking that the 
average ratio in the DAX 30 companies is only 0.9 percent compared to an average 
of 7.7% at the Dow Jones Industrial companies.10 Only DaimlerChrysler has a level 
                                                 
10 Given that stock option plans are typically long-term (three to seven years), convergence would not 
require that these ratios be the same, given the lag period needed for "catch-up". However, even 
allowing for a catch-up effect, the magnitude of the difference is still quite striking.  
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remotely approaching the US average (4.2 percent), which is not surprising given the 
attempt to increase German managerial compensation towards US levels within the 
merged firm.11  
 
A second overall indicator is the distribution of value added between different 
constituencies of the firm. Earlier research noted that a much higher proportion of 
value added goes shareholders in US and British companies than in German 
companies; De Jong (1997) finds that in the first half of the 1990s, shareholders (in 
the form of dividends) in Anglo-American companies received 15 percent of net value 
added versus three percent with "Germanic" companies. Beyer and Hassel (2003) in 
a study of the distribution of value added in German firms find that the proportion of 
value added going to shareholders has increased somewhat (from 2 to 2.8 percent in 
the second half of the 1990s, but sill remains far behind the level of 15 percent that 
de Jong reported for British firms.    
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that current developments in Germany can be characterized 
as important, but essentially incremental modifications in the stakeholder system of 
corporate governance. In this respect it has disagreed with the theses of "no 
essential changes" and of wholesale convergence to the Anglo-American 
shareholder model. The key issue for German corporate governance in the recent 
past has been how to change to deal with the demands for the implementation of 
shareholder value by institutional investors. These changes have been analyzed on 
two levels.  
 
On the institutional level, the major modification of the postwar stakeholder model 
has been the integration of institutional investors into an augmented stakeholder 
coalition. The greatest stability can be seen in the representation of labor, with the 
key role of the works council actually being strengthened through the reform of the 
Works Constitution Act in Germany in 2001. The power of the employees as a 
stakeholder group has therefore remained stable or even increased. The greatest 
changes have occurred in the sphere of ownership. In the postwar stakeholder 
coalition, large shareholders were the dominant owners. Small investors were 
generally passive and allowed their interests to be represented by banks. Rather 
than a wholesale shift toward dispersed ownership by institutional investors, which 
characterizes Anglo-American companies, however, the paper has argued that a 
"mixed" system of large shareholders and dispersed institutional investors is 
emerging. The postwar stakeholder coalition has thus been modified through the 
inclusion of institutional investors, rather than replaced by a shareholder system.   
 
On the level of practice, a system of negotiated shareholder value is emerging. 
Negotiated shareholder value is a stable alternative that is distinct from Anglo-
American shareholder value 1) in the processes by which decision-making takes 
place, and 2) in the outcomes that these negotiating processes lead to. Evidence can 
be found for bargaining processes between the members of the augmented 
stakeholder coalition, leading to a modification of the original demands for 
                                                 
11 Höpner (2003: 214) reports that the salaries of top German managers at Daimler Chrysler have also 
increased by  467 percent between 1996 and 2000, versus less than 50% at most other large German 
companies. 
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shareholder value when other members of the stakeholder coalition object. Macro 
data, for example in the granting of stock options and the division of value-added 
between different stakeholders, also supports this interpretation of a German variant 
of the Anglo-American form of shareholder value. 
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